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The Federalization of Corporate Governance—An 
Evolving Process 
Marc I. Steinberg* 
This Article focuses on the timely subject of the federalization of corporate 
governance in the United States from both contemporary and historical 
perspectives. Although the states traditionally have overseen the sphere of 
corporate governance, federal law today affects the governance of publicly 
held corporations to a greater extent than ever before in our nation’s history. 
This Article, drawn from the author’s recently published Oxford University 
Press book (The Federalization of Corporate Governance), addresses this 
timely subject from the commencement of the 20th century to the present. 
Through the decades, the federalization of corporate governance has gone 
through periods of activism, gradual transition, and stagnation. While the 
Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank Acts intensified this federalization 
process, it is an overstatement to conclude that these Acts comprise its 
foundational components. Rather, these Acts significantly enhanced the 
strong presence of federal corporate governance that already prevailed. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In my recent book, The Federalization of Corporate Governance, 
published by Oxford University Press,1 I explore the process of 
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federalization in the United States, commencing in 1903. During that 
decade (1903–1914), over twenty bills were introduced in Congress 
seeking to mandate federal chartering and/or the promulgation of federal 
minimum substantive standards.2 Indeed, both Presidents Roosevelt and 
Taft supported the institution of federal chartering.3 In the following two 
decades, seven additional bills were introduced that sought to achieve 
similar objectives.4 It was not until fifty years thereafter that another 
legislative effort was launched—Senator Howard Metzenbaum’s 
“Protection of Shareholders’ Rights Act of 1980”5—that prescribed 
federal minimum standards largely directed at codifying the duties of care 
and loyalty of corporate fiduciaries as well as empowering shareholders 
to bring suit to enforce the Act’s provisions.6 Nearly four decades 
thereafter, we now have our most recent salvo—Senator Elizabeth 
Warren’s “Accountable Capitalism Act,”7 which returns to concepts of 
yesteryear: mandating federal chartering of relatively large publicly held 
enterprises as well as regulating director composition, conduct, stock 
trading practices, and specified other matters.8  
 
1. MARC I. STEINBERG, THE FEDERALIZATION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2018). 
2. Id. at 28–70 (describing the bills). See Melvin I. Urofsky, Proposed Federal Incorporation 
in the Progressive Era, 26 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 160 (1982). In 1903, the Bureau of Corporations 
was established within the Department of Labor. See id. at 169. The Bureau had little enforcement 
authority and was subsequently replaced by the Federal Trade Commission with the enactment of 
the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914. See Arthur M. Johnson, Theodore Roosevelt and the 
Bureau of Corporations, 45 MISS. VALLEY HIST. REV. 571, 575, 589 n.74 (1959). 
3. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, UTILITY CORPORATIONS, S. DOC. NO. 92, pt. 69-A, at 18 (1934); 
sources set forth in STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 28–29.  
4. STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 71–77. 
5. S. 2567, 96th Cong. (1980) (“A Bill [t]o establish Federal minimum standards relating to 
composition of corporate boards, duties of corporate directors, audit and nominating committees, 
shareholders’ rights, and for other purposes. . . .”). 
6. Id. at 4. Although the bill was not enacted, a hearing was held. See Protection of 
Shareholders’ Rights Act of 1980: Hearing on S. 2567 Before the Subcomm. on Sec. of the Comm. 
on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 96th Cong. (1980). 
7. S. 3348, 115th Cong. (2018). 
8. Senator Warren’s bill requires US corporations that have greater than $1 billion in annual 
revenues to: 
[O]btain a federal charter from a newly formed Office of United States Corporations at 
the Department of Commerce [which would obligate] company directors to consider the 
interests of all corporate stakeholders—including employees, customers, shareholders, 
and the communities in which the company operates. . . [;] [e]mpower[] workers at 
United States corporations to elect at least 40% of Board members . . . [;] [r]estrict[] the 
sale of company shares by the directors and officers of United States corporations [by] 
prohibit[ing][such] directors and officers . . . from selling company shares within five 
years of receiving them or within three years of a company stock buyback. . . [;] 
[p]rohibit United States corporations from making any political expenditures without the 
approval of 75% of its directors and shareholders. . . ; and [p]ermit the federal 
government to revoke the charter of a United States corporation if the company has 
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All of these bills shared an identical fate: None were enacted.9 That 
does not signify, however, that they were futile gestures. Rather, a 
number of the provisions in these bills impacted subsequent 
developments. Examples include prohibiting corporate insiders from 
serving as officers or directors at competing corporations,10 requiring 
independent auditor certification of a subject company’s financial 
statements as a condition of issuing a federal charter,11 and the presence 
of federal regulatory mandates impacting executive officer 
remuneration.12 The current state of federal corporate governance is due, 
at least in part, to the dialogue that was generated by these bills from 
decades past. Indeed, to some degree, the Dodd-Frank Act’s13 
shareholder say-on-pay advisory vote may trace its origins to a bill 
introduced in the midst of the Great Depression that required federal 
regulatory approval of officer compensation.14 
Hence, the federalization of corporate governance is an evolutionary 
process that commenced well over a century ago. As such, it is a 
simplification to assert that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 200215 and the 
 
engaged in repeated and egregious illegal conduct. 
Press Release, Elizabeth Warren, Warren Introduces Accountable Capitalism Act (Aug. 15, 2018), 
https://www.warren.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/warren-introduces-accountable-
capitalism-act. Over 1300 of the New York Stock Exchange’s approximate 2800 listed companies 
would be subject to the bill’s provisions. See NYSE Companies, NASDAQ, 
https://www.nasdaq.com/screening/companies-by-industry.aspx?exchange=NYSE&region 
=North+America&pagesize=200 (last visited Apr. 1, 2019). Not surprisingly, the bill’s provisions 
have been criticized. See, e.g., Tory Newmyer, The Finance 202: Elizabeth Warren Takes on 




9. See discussion in STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 28–79. 
10. With specified exceptions, this prohibition was codified in the Clayton Act of 1914. 15 
U.S.C. § 19 (2012). 
11. Today, audited financial statements of publicly held companies are required to be contained 
in a number of SEC filings, including in the annual Form 10-K report. See, e.g., SEC Form 10-K, 
17 C.F.R. § 249.310 (2018). 
12. Today, extensive disclosure is required of executive officer remuneration. See Regulation 
S-K, Item 402, 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (2018). In addition, pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act, 
shareholders have a non-binding say-on-pay vote with respect to executive compensation. See 
§ 14A of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1(a)(1) (2012). 
13. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 951 (adding § 14A to the 
Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1(a)(1) (2012)). See Shareholder Approval of Executive 
Compensation and Golden Parachute Compensation, Securities Act Release No. 9178, Exchange 
Act Release No. 63,768, 100 SEC Docket 868 (Jan. 25, 2011). 
14. See S. 2847, 71st Cong. § 3 (1930) (requiring that the Federal Trade Commission approve 
managing officers’ salaries of subject enterprises). 
15. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201–66 (2012)). 
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Dodd-Frank Act of 201016 are the foundational components in this 
process. Rather, these Acts further reinforced federal corporate 
governance as a strong presence. These Acts also serve as a poignant 
reminder to the states—the principal overseers of corporate 
governance—that laxity toward fiduciary conduct may induce the 
passage of federal legislation in an effort to remediate state shortcomings, 
particularly during times of crisis.17 
To illustrate this point, the next Section of the Article explores several 
developments at the federal level where corporate governance practices 
were embraced in the pre-Sarbanes-Oxley era, thereby decreasing state 
oversight. Thereafter, examples will be provided that this federalism, at 
times, has sought to enhance capital formation and to limit fiduciary 
liability while adversely impacting the investing public. Last, the Article 
will examine a number of SEC enforcement practices post-Lehman that 
merit reexamination. 
I.  AN EVOLVING PROCESS: THE FEDERALIZATION OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE  
With the enactment of the federal securities acts in 1933 and 1934,18 
the federal government became the premier overseer of the multifaceted 
aspects of securities regulation. Through the years, the passage of 
additional federal legislation as well as the adoption of SEC regulatory 
measures have impacted the federalization of corporate governance. This 
Section provides several examples of this federalization process. 
The first example focuses on the federalization of insider trading. 
Congress took a key step in this federalization process with the enactment 
of Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.19 Going beyond 
disclosure, this statute precludes corporate officers and directors from 
engaging in short sales of their company’s securities20 and mandates that 
such insiders (as well as those beneficial shareholders who own more 
than ten percent of a subject equity security) to disgorge their profits 
when they purchase and sell (or sell and purchase) such equity security 
 
16. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 
Stat. 1376 (2010). 
17. Marc I. Steinberg, The Federalization of Corporate Governance, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON 
CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (June 21, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/ 
2018/06/21/the-federalization-of-corporate-governance/. 
18. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2012); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78qq (2012). 
19. 15 U.S.C. § 78p. 
20. Id. § 16(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(c). Generally, short-selling is “the sale of a security that the 
seller does not own or that the seller owns but does not deliver.” Ralph S. Janvey, Short Selling, 20 
SEC. REG. L.J. 270, 271 (1992). 
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within a six-month period.21 
Subsequently, frustrated with state court reluctance to address suspect 
insider trading in the secondary trading markets under traditional 
fiduciary duty of loyalty concepts,22 the SEC (Commission) in 1961 
handed down its monumental decision in Cady, Roberts & Co.23 There, 
the Commission embraced the “access” rationale—namely, that those 
persons who, through their profession or other status, have unequal access 
to material and nonpublic information must either disclose that 
information to the investing public or must abstain from tipping and 
trading until such disclosure is made.24 With the Second Circuit’s seminal 
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur decision seven years thereafter,25 adhering to 
a broad prohibition against insider trading,26 the substantive law of 
 
21. § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (stating in part that the statute’s purpose is “preventing the 
unfair use of information which may have been obtained by such [subject] beneficial owner, 
director, or officer by reason of his relationship to the issuer”). Suit may be brought by the subject 
corporation or an eligible shareholder as specified in the statute. Strict liability applies. See, e.g., 
Whiting v. Dow Chem. Co., 523 F.2d 680, 687 (2d Cir. 1975). Section 16(a) generally requires 
persons subject to the statute to report to the Commission and the applicable securities exchange 
their holdings in equity securities and their transactions in these securities. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a). 
22. A key item on the SEC Chairman’s agenda was to fill the state law void with respect to 
open-market insider trading. Chairman Cary believed that it was “shocking for business executives 
to personally profit from their inside information about the corporations they managed [and] that 
those actions were likely to reduce public confidence . . . in the markets.” Fair to All People: The 
SEC and the Regulation of Insider Trading, In the Matter of Cady, Roberts & Company,  SEC HIST. 
SOC’Y (Nov. 1, 2006), http://www.sechistorical.org/museum/galleries/it/takeCommand_b.php. See 
Donald C. Langevoort, Rereading Cady, Roberts: The Ideology and Practice of Insider Trading 
Regulation, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1319, 1320 (1999) (observing that Chairman Cary’s “speeches and 
writings during and after his chairmanship at the SEC leave little doubt that he believed that state 
corporate law was moribund, perhaps even corrupt”). In this regard, see William L. Cary, 
Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974). 
23. Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). 
24. Id. at 910. The Commission was well aware of the significance of the proceeding, stating: 
“This is a case of first impression and one of signal importance in our administration of the Federal 
securities acts.” Id. at 907. In that proceeding, the SEC viewed its authority as expansive, asserting 
that “the securities acts may be said to have generated a wholly new and far-reaching body of 
Federal corporation law.” Id. at 910. 
25. SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. 
Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). In celebration of the 50th anniversary of this seminal decision, 
the SMU Law Review has published a Symposium Issue. See Texas Gulf Sulphur 50th Anniversary 
Symposium Issue, 71 SMU L. REV. 625 (2018). 
26. The Second Circuit in Texas Gulf Sulphur enunciated both a parity of information rule and 
an access rule. With respect to the parity of information rationale, the court stated that  
anyone in possession of material inside information must either disclose it to the 
investing public, or, if he is disabled from disclosing it in order to protect a corporate 
confidence, or he chooses not to do so, must abstain from trading in or recommending 
the securities concerned while such information remains undisclosed. 
401 F.2d at 848. Focusing on the access approach, the court opined that Section 10(b) sought to 
ensure that “all investors trading on impersonal exchanges have relatively equal access to material 
information . . . .” Id. Note that many countries with developed securities markets have adopted 
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insider trading became federalized.27 Although US Supreme Court 
decisions subsequently limited the parameters of the insider trading 
proscription,28 these high court decisions reinforced the principle that the 
practice of insider trading principally is a matter within the purview of 
federal, rather than state, law.29 
Another early example of the federalization of corporate governance 
is the SEC’s adoption in 1942 of the shareholder proposal rule.30 Clearly, 
the conducting of shareholder meetings and items placed on the agenda 
for such meetings traditionally have been regulated by state law.31 This 
principle remains vibrant today.32 Nonetheless, since 1942, eligible 
shareholders have been entitled under the federal regime to include their 
precatory proposals in the subject company’s proxy materials in an effort 
to advance social, political, and economic causes.33 Since its adoption, 
 
either the parity or access approach. See, e.g., Directive 2014/57/EU, of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on Criminal Sanctions for Market Abuse, 2014 O.J. (L 173) 
Art. III.; Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 1043A (Austl.); Ontario Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c S-5 
s 76(5) (Can.); discussion in STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 273. 
27. See STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 123. 
28. In Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980), the Supreme Court rejected the parity of 
information and access approaches. Rather, such a duty arises where a fiduciary duty or a 
relationship of trust and confidence exists. Id. at 230. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 
(1997) (adopting the misappropriation theory premised on a breach of fiduciary duty or relationship 
of trust and confidence to the source of the information). In the tipper-tippee context, unlawful 
tipping likewise occurs when the tipper conveys the material nonpublic information in breach of 
his or her fiduciary duty—normally shown through the knowing receipt by the tipper of a pecuniary 
benefit or the knowing conveyance of a gift to the tippee-recipient of the subject information. See 
Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983). Notably, the 
parity of information rule survives in one context under US insider trading law—namely, in the 
tender offer setting where SEC Rule 14e-3 adheres to this approach. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (2018). 
In addition, SEC Regulation FD, with certain exceptions, precludes selective disclosure by 
company insiders and intermediaries of material nonpublic information. 17 C.F.R. 
§§ 243.100–.103. See generally WILLIAM K.S. WANG & MARC I. STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING 
(Oxford Univ. Press 3d ed. 2010). 
29. See STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 124–25 (asserting that, “although the Supreme Court has 
narrowed the scope of the insider trading prohibition, the legacy of Cady, Roberts and Texas Gulf 
Sulphur comprises the foundation for the federalization of this important component of corporate 
governance”); Roberta S. Karmel, Prosecution of Tippees Affirmed in Salman v. United States, 45 
SEC. REG. L.J. 195, 199 (2017) (noting it was “important” that the Supreme Court in Salman 
“unanimously approved insider trading prosecutions pursuant to Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act 
and Rule 10b-5 against remote tippees”). 
30. Rule 14a-8, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8. See General Rules and Regulations, Solicitation of 
Proxies Under the Act, Exchange Act Release No. 3347, 7 Fed. Reg. 10,637, 10,655–56 (Dec. 22, 
1942) (explaining the impact of the shareholder proposal rule). 
31. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 7.01, 7.02, 7.05, 7.08, 7.25 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016); 
Delaware General Corporation Law, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 216, 222 (2018). 
32. See, e.g., Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971); Superwire.com, Inc. 
v. Hampton, 805 A.2d 904 (Del. Ch. 2002); Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. 
Ch. 1988). 
33. See, e.g., Trinity Wall St. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 792 F.3d 323 (3d Cir. 2015) (submission 
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the shareholder proposal rule periodically has been revised.34 As 
anticipated, the rule has both ardent supporters35 and fierce critics who 
advocate for its repeal.36 Having endured for longer than three quarters 
of a century, the rule is not easily dissolved. In this context, the SEC’s 
shareholder proposal rule is a vivid example that the federalization of 
corporate governance is an evolving process dating back to the early 
years of federal securities regulation. 
Through the decades, the Commission has sought to impact normative 
fiduciary conduct through the guise of disclosure.37 Implementing the 
philosophy that revelation of management self-dealing, related party 
transactions, and remuneration practices may induce enhanced 
substantive standards, the SEC has promulgated disclosure standards 
under Regulation S-K.38 To address defective disclosure in this context, 
the Commission has brought enforcement actions against subject 
fiduciaries. For example, in a 1964 proceeding, the Commission found 
that lack of disclosure relating to fiduciary self-dealing in a company’s 
registration statement was material to investors, as this information was 
 
of shareholder proposal regarding company’s policy of selling firearms equipped with 
high-capacity magazines); Med. Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970) 
(submission of shareholder proposal requesting company to cease its manufacturing of napalm used 
in Vietnam War), vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972); Laborers’ Local v. Intersil, 868 F. Supp. 
2d 838 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (holding shareholder say-on-pay vote does not rebut application of 
business judgment rule). 
34. See SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14 (July 13, 2001), available at 
https://www.sec.gov/interps/legal/cfslb14.htm (setting forth the substantive grounds for the 
exclusion of shareholder proposals pursuant to Rule 14a-8); Amendments to Rules on Shareholder 
Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 40,018, 67 SEC Docket 373 (May 1, 1998); SEC Requests 
Comments on Proxy Rule Revision, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) No. 2836, at 5 (2018) (seeking 
comments on whether the SEC’s proxy rules should be revised). 
35. See discussion in Virginia J. Harnisch, Rule 14a-8 After Reagan: Does It Protect Social 
Responsibility Shareholder Proposals?, 6 J.L. & POL. 415 (1990); Patrick J. Ryan, Rule 14a-8, 
Institutional Shareholder Proposals, and Corporate Democracy, 23 GA. L. REV. 97 (1988); Donald 
E. Schwartz, The Public-Interest Proxy Contest: Reflections on Campaign GM, 69 MICH. L. REV. 
419 (1971). 
36. See discussion in Stephen M. Bainbridge, Revitalizing SEC Rule 14a-8’s Ordinary Business 
Exclusion: Preventing Shareholder Micromanagement by Proposal, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 705 
(2016); Susan W. Liebeler, A Proposal to Rescind the Shareholder Proposal Rule, 18 GA. L. REV. 
425 (1984); Alan R. Palmiter, The Shareholder Proposal Rule: A Failed Experiment in Merit 
Regulation, 45 ALA. L. REV. 879 (1994). Nonetheless, it may be asserted that, in practical effect, 
the shareholder proposal rule “is well entrenched as an accepted facilitator of shareholder activism 
and of dialogue between management and institutional shareholders . . . [and] should be recognized 
as a vintage asset—a Rule that has symbolized for 75 years that vibrant federal corporate 
governance at times is an appropriate vehicle for ameliorating state law shortcomings.” STEINBERG, 
supra note 1, at 190. 
37. See Ralph C. Ferrara, Richard M. Starr & Marc I. Steinberg, Disclosure of Information 
Bearing on Management Integrity and Competency, 76 NW. U.L. Rev. 555 (1981). 
38. See, e.g., Items 401, 402, 404 of Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.401, .402, .404 (2018). 
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“germane to an evaluation of the integrity of . . . management.”39 
Similarly, in the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s 1977 decision in 
Santa Fe Industries v. Green,40 holding that Section 10(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act41 encompasses only deceptive and manipulative 
conduct and not “mere” breaches of fiduciary duty,42 the SEC 
promulgated Rule 13e-3.43 Through the mechanism of disclosure, that 
rule and its implementing provisions seek to impact fiduciary substantive 
conduct in the going-private setting44 by mandating that the subject 
person disclose whether it reasonably believes that the going-private 
transaction is fair or unfair to unaffiliated security holders and the bases 
for such belief.45 Defective disclosure in this context may give rise to 
both government and private lawsuits.46 
On occasion, the SEC has nullified state law. One such example is the 
SEC’s adoption of the all-holders rule mandating that tender offers by 
publicly held enterprises must be open to all shareholders.47 The 
Commission’s action was in response to the Delaware Supreme Court’s 
 
39. Franchard Corp., 42 S.E.C. 163, 172 (1964) (also opining that the “quality” of executive 
officers to investors is of “cardinal importance”). See Maldonado v. Flynn, 597 F.2d 789, 796 (2d 
Cir. 1979) (stating that “shareholders are entitled to truthful presentation of factual information 
‘impugning the honesty, loyalty or competency of directors’ in their dealings with the corporation 
to which they owe a fiduciary duty.” (quoting Cohen v. Ayers, 449 F. Supp. 298, 317 (N.D. Ill. 
1978), aff’d, 596 F.2d 733 (7th Cir. 1979))). 
40. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977). 
41. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012). 
42. 430 U.S. at 477–79. The Court reversed the Second Circuit’s expansive decision that 
recognized a Section 10(b) claim without requiring deficiency of disclosure. In that decision, the 
Second Circuit opined: “If there is no valid corporate purpose for the merger, then even the most 
brazen disclosure of that fact to the minority shareholders in no way mitigates the fraudulent 
conduct.” Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283, 1292 (2d Cir. 1976), rev’d, 430 U.S. 462 
(1977). See generally Ralph C. Ferrara & Marc I. Steinberg, A Reappraisal of Santa Fe: Rule 10b-5 
and the New Federalism, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 263 (1980). 
43. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3. See Going Private Transactions by Public Companies or their 
Affiliates, Securities Act Release No. 6100, Exchange Act Release No. 16,075, 44 Fed. Reg. 46,736 
(Aug. 8, 1979). 
44. See Harold N. Iselin, Note, Regulating Going Private Transactions: SEC Rule 13e-3, 80 
COLUM. L. REV. 782, 787 (1980) (asserting that “rule 13e-3 does in effect regulate substantive 
fairness through item 8’s requirement that the issuer state its reasonable belief that the transaction 
is fair or unfair”). A going-private transaction  
[r]efers to a transaction or series of transactions in a publicly held company whereby the 
controlling (or other) group substantially reduces or eliminates entirely the number of 
shares held by the public by inducing shareholders to exchange their stock for cash, 
thereby causing the company to attain privately held status. 
MARC I. STEINBERG, UNDERSTANDING SECURITIES LAW 486 (7th ed. 2018). 
45. See Rule 13e-3(e), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3(e); Schedule 13E-3, item 8, 17 C.F.R. § 13e-100; 
Regulation M-A, item 1014, 17 C.F.R. § 229.1014. 
46. See, e.g., Howing Co. v. Nationwide Corp., 826 F.2d 1470 (6th Cir. 1987); FSC Corp., 
Exchange Act Release No. 17,892, 22 SEC Docket 1374 (June 25, 1981). 
47. See SEC Rules 13e-4, 14d-10, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13e-4, .14d-10. 
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decision in Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co.48 There, the court held that a 
target company’s selective tender offer that excluded the hostile bidder 
from participating in the offer was an appropriate response by the board 
of directors.49 By its promulgation of the all-holders rule, the 
Commission, in practical effect, “reversed” the Delaware Supreme 
Court’s decision with respect to publicly held companies. In doing so, the 
SEC nullified a significant holding by this nation’s preeminent state court 
in corporate law matters. The rule thus provides a clear example in the 
pre-Sarbanes-Oxley era of the SEC acting proactively to federalize this 
area of corporate governance.50 
From a historical perspective, for decades, SEC enforcement actions 
have impacted corporate governance.51 In several enforcement 
proceedings, the Commission successfully has procured far-reaching 
orders of ancillary relief mandating that the subject corporation undertake 
such fundamental measures as the appointment of independent 
directors,52 the retention of independent legal counsel who is tasked with 
investigating and reporting regarding specified aspects of the company’s 
affairs,53 and the appointment of independent consultants.54 To a 
significant degree, the SEC’s use of Undertakings in its enforcement 
 
48. Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
49. Id. at 958 (opining that “there was directorial power to oppose the Mesa tender offer, and to 
undertake a selective stock exchange made in good faith and upon a reasonable investigation 
pursuant to a clear duty to protect the corporate enterprise”). 
50. In the adopting release, the Commission reasoned: 
[M]any commentators have asserted that the Commission’s authority under this 
provision is limited to regulating disclosure. It is clear, however, that in adopting the 
Williams Act, Congress granted to the Commission broad rulemaking authority in 
Section 13(e) to determine the most appropriate regulatory scheme for issuer tender 
offers . . . [including the] adoption of substantive regulations. 
Amendments to Tender Offer Rules—All-Holders and Best-Price, Securities Act Release No. 
6653, Exchange Act Release No. 23,421, 1986 WL 703866, at *6 (July 11, 1986). See discussion 
in STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 140–42. 
51. The Commission’s enforcement actions ordinarily are through the consent negotiation 
process whereby the subject party agrees to the sanctions levied without admitting or denying the 
SEC’s allegations. See William R. McLucas et al., “Neither Admit Nor Deny” Settlements from the 
Stanley Sporkin Era: Wise Policy or Outdated Enforcement Notion?, 43 SEC. REG. L.J. 29 (2015).  
52. See, e.g., SEC v. Mattel, Inc., [1974–1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 
¶ 94,807 (D.D.C. Oct. 1, 1974). A recent example is Tesla’s undertaking to appoint two new 
independent directors to its board of directors pursuant to the settlement of an SEC enforcement 
action. See Press Release, SEC, Elon Musk Settles SEC Fraud Charges; Tesla Charged with and 
Resolves Securities Law Charge (Sept. 29, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-
226 [hereinafter Musk Press Release]. 
53. See, e.g., SEC v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., [1975–1976 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH) ¶ 95,509 (D.D.C. Apr. 13, 1976). 
54. See, e.g., Occidental Petroleum Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 16,950, [1980 Transfer 
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 82,622 (SEC July 2, 1980). 
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actions continues today.55 
A vivid historical example of the Commission’s “intrusion” in the 
corporate governance area through the use of Undertakings is its 1980 
proceeding against Occidental Petroleum Corporation (Oxy).56 In a 
settlement whereby the company did not admit wrongdoing,57 the SEC 
alleged that Oxy failed to disclose several material facts relating to such 
matters as 
Oxy’s discharge of chemical or toxic wastes . . . into the 
environment; . . . the status of Oxy’s negotiations with Libya 
concerning the financial arrangement pursuant to which Oxy operated 
in Libya; and . . . signed, undated letters of resignation which were 
submitted by certain nominees to Oxy’s Board of Directors at the 
request of Dr. Armand Hammer, the Chairman of the [Oxy] Board.58 
Pursuant to the settlement, Oxy agreed to undertake several significant 
corporate governance enhancements, including, for example, designating 
a director deemed “satisfactory” by the Commission who was tasked with 
the responsibility for: the preparation of an environmental report 
recommending procedures to the board of directors to ensure the timely 
and accurate disclosure of all mandated information relating to the 
company’s environmental matters; reasonably determining the potential 
costs which the company would incur within the subsequent three years 
in order to make its facilities compliant with applicable government 
environmental requirements; and ascertaining the maximum monetary 
penalties as well as monetary damages that may be incurred by the 
company for such environmental noncompliance.59 The settlement 
 
55. For example, the appointment of independent consultants and monitors occurs today with 
some frequency. See, e.g., Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., [2016–2017 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. 
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 81,573 (SEC Jan. 10, 2017) (appointment of independent consultant); SEC v. Avon 
Prods., Inc., Civil Action No. 14-CV-9956 (KPF) (S.D.N.Y.), Litigation Release No. 23,159, 110 
SEC Docket 2714 (Dec. 17, 2014) (appointment of independent monitor); John J. Huber et al., The 
Brave New World of SEC Monitorships, 43 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1480 (2011) (asserting that 
“the SEC may increasingly require appointment of a monitor as part of a settlement of an 
enforcement action”). 
56. Occidental Petroleum Corp., [1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 82,622. In 
view of its prominence, all seven editions of my Securities Regulation textbook contain this 
proceeding. See, e.g., MARC I. STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATION 1182–90 (7th ed. 2017). 
57. Occidental Petroleum Corp., [1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 83,347. 
58. Id. at 83,348. 
59. Id. at 83,356. Disclosure as to environmental matters, including the costs of compliance, 
remains a focus of the SEC disclosure mandates. With respect to climate change, see Commission 
Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, Securities Act Release No. 9106, 
Exchange Act Release 61,469, 97 SEC Docket 2414, 2415 (Feb. 2, 2010) (“This release outlines 
our views with respect to our existing disclosure requirements as they apply to climate change . . . 
[and] is intended to assist companies in satisfying their disclosure obligations under the federal 
securities laws and regulations.”). 
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provided that the SEC could consult with the subject director and was 
entitled to access the materials that were generated in the preparation of 
the environmental report.60 The director also was tasked with utilizing 
the company’s newly appointed senior environmental official as well as 
an independent consulting firm, each of whom was required to be deemed 
acceptable to the Commission, to assist in the preparation of the report.61 
Regarding the signed, undated letters of resignation from the subject 
directors, Oxy was ordered to make requisite disclosure of the change in 
its policy.62 Reflecting on this meaningful settlement, I opined in my 
recent book: 
 That a New York Stock Exchange Company in the late 1970s had its 
nominees sign undated letters of resignation is surprising and perhaps 
shocking. By invoking its authority enforcing the securities laws’ 
adequacy-of-disclosure mandate, the SEC in Oxy attained a meaningful 
measure of remediation with respect to the company’s environmental 
practices as well as corporate governance practices. This proceeding as 
well as others instituted by the Commission over four decades ago 
exemplify the SEC’s impact on enhancing compliance with the law in 
areas outside of the securities laws as well as inducing improved 
standards of corporate governance.63 
A last example focuses on the SEC’s authority to bar subject persons 
from serving as an officer or director of any publicly held company. The 
Commission’s power to levy this sanction is based on both congressional 
legislation and its entitlement to procure ancillary relief in its 
enforcement actions.64 The SEC has obtained bar orders in settlements as 
well as in litigated proceedings.65 In this context, violation of the 
securities acts’ antifraud provisions coupled with a finding of “unfitness” 
 
60. Occidental Petroleum Corp., [1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 83,357. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. (providing that Occidental “will make appropriate disclosure of a change in its policy 
that neither Oxy nor any officer, director or employee of the company will request or receive any 
written or oral agreement, assurance or promise of any kind from any nominee to, or member of, 
Oxy’s Board of Directors as it now is or may in the future be constituted”). 
63. STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 145. 
64. The SEC received statutory authority to procure officer and director bar orders pursuant to 
The Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-429, 
104 Stat. 931 (1990). The Commission obtained this relief in a litigated case as early as 1974. See 
SEC v. Techni-Culture, Inc., [1973–1974 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 94,501 (D. 
Ariz. Apr. 2, 1974). 
65. See, e.g., SEC v. Posner, 16 F.3d 520 (2d Cir. 1994). Recently, pursuant to the settlement 
of an SEC enforcement action, Elon Musk agreed to step down as Tesla’s Chairman for at least a 
three-year period. See Musk Press Release, supra note 52; Tim Higgins et al., Tesla Braces for 
Uncertainty Amid Shift in Elon Musk’s Role, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 30, 2018, 8:02 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/tesla-braces-for-uncertainty-amid-shift-in-musks-role-1538352138. 
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are the requisite components for the imposition of a bar order.66 For the 
last several decades (since 1974), the Commission has utilized this 
enforcement measure to prevent allegedly miscreant fiduciaries from 
serving as officers and directors of publicly held companies.67 In this 
way, with Congress’s authorization, the officer and director bar sanction 
has preempted state corporate governance in a very traditional 
area—namely, the appointment and election of directors in a duly 
incorporated enterprise pursuant to applicable state governing 
principles.68 
It also bears emphasis that the national stock exchanges have played 
an important role in this federalization process. Over forty years ago, with 
the SEC’s “persuasion,” the New York Stock Exchange adopted a rule 
mandating that the composition of a listed corporation’s audit committee 
must consist solely of independent directors.69 Today, a number of 
provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank Acts condition the 
eligibility of a subject enterprise to list its shares on a national stock 
exchange by mandating that such enterprise comply with the Acts’ 
requirements.70 Through this process of government directives and SEC 
persuasion, the national stock exchanges have advanced the 
 
66. See § 305 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) 
(amending §§ 8A, 20(e) of the Securities Act and §§ 21(d)(2), 21C of the Securities Exchange Act). 
Prior to the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the standard was “substantial unfitness” as 
enacted pursuant to the Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, 
Pub. L. No. 101-429, 104 Stat. 931 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq.). 
67. See, e.g., SEC v. Bankosky, 716 F.3d 45 (2d Cir. 2013); SEC v. Jasper, 678 F.3d 1116 (9th 
Cir. 2012); SEC v. Patel, 61 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 1995); SEC v. Techni-Culture, Inc., [1973–1974 
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 94,501 (D. Ariz. Apr. 2, 1974); sources cited in MARC 
I. STEINBERG & RALPH C. FERRARA, SECURITIES PRACTICE: FEDERAL AND STATE ENFORCEMENT 
§ 6:18 (2d ed. 2001 & 2018–2019 supp.). 
68. See STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 146–47. 
69. See New York Stock Exchange, Inc.: Order Approving Proposed Rules Change, Exchange 
Act Release No. 13,346, 1977 WL 173602 (Mar. 9, 1977) (approving NYSE audit committee rule). 
In that release, the SEC stated that it “has urged strengthening the independence and vitality of 
corporate boards of directors and has suggested that, at least initially, those principles could be 
implemented by amending the listing requirements of the NYSE and other self-regulatory 
organizations, rather than by direct Commission action.” Id. at *1; see discussion in STEINBERG, 
supra note 1, at 241. 
70. See, e.g., § 301 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002; SEC Rule 10A-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-3 
(2018) (stating that “[t]he rules of each national securities exchange registered pursuant to section 
6 of the [Securities Exchange] Act must, in accordance with the provisions of this rule, prohibit the 
initial or continued listing of any security of an issuer that is not in compliance with the 
requirements of . . . this rule [addressing audit committee requirements]”); § 952 of the Dodd-Frank 
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1900 (2010) (adding § 10C to the Securities Exchange 
Act) (mandating that the SEC, by rule, is to direct the national securities exchanges to prohibit the 
listing of any equity security of a subject issuer that does not comply with the statute’s requirements 
regarding an independent compensation committee). 
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federalization of corporate governance.71 
When considered from this perspective, the Sarbanes-Oxley and 
Dodd-Frank Acts are a continuation of this federalization journey.72 
Focusing on such matters as the presence of independent directors, the 
composition, functions, and roles of board committees (including the 
audit and compensation committees), the prohibition of company loans 
to officers and directors, the shareholder advisory say-on-pay vote, and 
the promulgation of corporate codes of conduct,73 these Acts 
significantly impact normative fiduciary conduct. These Acts thus 
reinforce the strong presence of federal corporate governance. They also 
are a poignant reminder to the states that the lax oversight of corporate 
fiduciary conduct may portend the enactment of vibrant federal 
legislation, particularly during times of crisis.74 
II.  THE FEDERALIZATION PROCESS ADVERSELY IMPACTING INVESTORS 
 The federalization of corporate governance typically associates the 
enactment of federal legislation and the presence of vibrant SEC 
regulation with greater investor protection. The discussion in the 
preceding Section of this Article serves to illustrate this principle.75 
Nonetheless, during the past few decades, actions taken by Congress, the 
US Supreme Court, and the SEC to federalize certain aspects of corporate 
governance have been antithetical to investor interests. This Section 
provides a number of examples where federalization has adversely 
impacted investors. 
Commencing in 1980 with the adoption of Rule 506 of Regulation D,76 
the SEC slighted US Supreme Court precedent set forth in SEC v. Ralston 
 
71. See discussion in STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 191–262. 
72. See supra notes 1–3. 
73. See STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 191–224; Symposium, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 469 (2008); 
Symposium, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1597 (2007); Robert B. Ahdieh, From “Federalization” to “Mixed 
Governance” in Corporate Law: A Defense of Sarbanes-Oxley, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 721 (2005); 
Roberta S. Karmel, Realizing the Dream of William O. Douglas—The Securities and Exchange 
Commission Takes Charge of Corporate Governance, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 79 (2005); Charles W. 
Murdock, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act: What Caused the 
Financial Crisis and Will Dodd-Frank Prevent Future Crises?, 64 SMU L. REV. 1243 (2011); 
Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 
YALE L.J. 1521 (2005). 
74. See Steinberg, supra note 17; Marc I. Steinberg, Curtailing Investor Protection Under the 
Securities Laws: Good for the Economy?, 55 SMU L. REV. 347 (2002). 
75. See supra notes 19–74 and accompanying text. 
76. See Revision of Certain Exemptions from Registration for Transactions Involving Limited 
Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 6389, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,243, 11,251 (Mar. 16, 1982). 
Rule 506 is an issuer exemption from Securities Act registration of the subject securities. 
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Purina Co.77 by equating an individual’s personal wealth with financial 
sophistication and access to registration-type information.78 Seeking to 
enhance capital formation, the Commission determined that an 
individual’s net worth of $1 million creates an irrebuttable presumption 
of accredited investor status, signifying that such person has the requisite 
financial sophistication and has access to registration-type information.79 
As a consequence, no information is required to be provided to the 
accredited investor under SEC rules—although some disclosure is made 
pursuant to the negotiation process and to comply with the antifraud 
provisions.80 Although inflation through the years effectively has diluted 
this $1 million level, the SEC has refused to adjust this monetary 
amount.81 Indeed, it was not until the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 where 
Congress took some action, mandating that the $1 million net worth level 
must be exclusive of the value of one’s primary residence.82 
Although a majority of the states in the interpretation of their 
respective securities laws generally acquiesced in the SEC’s approach,83 
a number of states adhered to greater investor safeguards.84 As a result, 
 
77. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953). For an example of a lower court decision 
after Ralston Purina supporting the proposition that one’s financial wealth does not equate to 
financial sophistication, see Doran v. Petroleum Management Corp., 545 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1977). 
78. See SEC Rules 501(a), 502(b), 506(b), (c), 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501(a), .502(b), .506(b), (c). 
79. See Revision of Certain Exemptions from Registration for Transactions Involving Limited 
Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 6389, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,243, 11,251 (Mar. 16, 1982). 
See Marc I. Steinberg, The Securities and Exchange Commission’s Administrative, Enforcement, 
and Legislative Programs and Policies—Their Influence on Corporate Internal Affairs, 58 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 173, 209–14 (1982) (criticizing the SEC’s promulgation of Rule 506). 
80. See STEINBERG, supra note 56, at 121–38. 
81. See Marc I. Steinberg, The “Accredited” Individual Purchaser Under SEC Regulation D: 
Time to Up the Ante, 29 SEC. REG. L.J. 93 (2001) (urging the Commission to raise the $1 million 
level and pointing out that the $1 million net worth level in 1982 adjusted for inflation represented 
a net worth of less than $600,000 in September 2000). 
82. See § 413(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77b (2012); Net Worth Standard for 
Accredited Investors, Securities Act Release No. 9287, 76 Fed. Reg. 81,787, 81,793 (Dec. 21, 
2011). The $1 million net worth level is to be reviewed periodically by the Commission to ascertain 
whether this level should be adjusted. See § 413(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act. To date, the SEC has 
not raised this $1 million net worth level.  
83. See Uniform Limited Offering Exemption (North American Securities Administrators 
Association (NASAA), NASAA Rep. (CCH) ¶ 6201 (1983); SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT ON 
THE UNIFORMITY OF STATE REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS FOR OFFERINGS OF SECURITIES THAT 
ARE NOT “COVERED SECURITIES” (1997), available at https://www.sec.gov/news/ 
studies/uniformy.htm (citing Mark A. Sargent and Hugh H. Makens, ULOE: New Hope, New 
Challenge, 45 BUS. LAW. 1319, 1320 n.9 (1990)) (stating that approximately thirty states had 
adopted ULOE).  
84. See SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 83; STEINBERG, supra note 44, at 99 (discussing the 
position of the Maryland Securities Division in a letter sent by its Commissioner Ellyn L. Brown 
to the SEC in May 1988). 
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this lack of uniformity was perceived as impairing capital formation.85 
Congress responded by enacting the National Securities Markets 
Improvement Act of 1996.86 Among other provisions, this Act preempted 
the states from regulating offerings that are effected in compliance with 
Rule 506 of Regulation D.87 The result of this federal preemption is that 
Rule 506 serves as the key issuer exemption from Securities Act 
registration and has been largely successful in its mission to enhance 
capital formation.88 This success is tempered by the fact that 
unsophisticated individuals, who have $1 million in net worth (exclusive 
of primary residence), are subject to substantially greater risk of incurring 
financial loss.89 
Another example focuses on the aftermath of Congress’s enactment of 
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA),90 as well 
as restrictive US Supreme Court decisions. In 1994, in Central Bank of 
Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,91 the Court, slighting the 
overwhelming view held by the federal appellate courts,92 held that (in 
private actions) Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act93 does not 
provide for aider and abettor liability.94 In ascertaining the parameters of 
 
85. See SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 83, at Summary of Findings (stating that “there is still 
more to be done to accomplish true uniformity among the states in their regulation of offerings of 
securities that are not ‘covered securities’”); Therese H. Maynard, The Uniform Limited Offering 
Exemption: How ‘Uniform’ Is ‘Uniform?’—An Evaluation and Critique of the ULOE, 36 EMORY 
L.J. 357 (1987). 
86. Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 (1996). See generally Robert G. Bagnall & Kimble 
Cannon, The National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996: Summary and Discussion, 25 
SEC. REG. L.J. 3 (1997). 
87. See § 18(b)(4)(F), 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4)(F) (2012). Recently, in promulgating an exemption 
pursuant to Tier 2 of Regulation A, the states now are preempted from regulating these offerings. 
See SEC Rules 251–263, 17 C.F.R. 230.251–.263 (2018); Amendments for Small and Additional 
Issues Exemptions Under the Securities Act (Regulation A), Securities Act Release No. 9741, 
Exchange Act Release No. 74,578, 111 SEC Docket 455 (Mar. 25, 2015). The effort by a number 
of states to declare this regulation invalid was unsuccessful. See Lindeen v. SEC, 825 F.3d 646 
(D.C. Cir. 2016) (upholding validity of Tier 2 of Regulation A). 
88. See Revision of Certain Exemptions From Registration for Transactions Involving Limited 
Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 6389, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,243, 11,251 (Mar. 10, 1988); 
Regulation D Revisions, Securities Act Release No. 6758, 40 SEC Docket 449 (Mar. 3, 1988); 
Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Advertising in Rule 506 and 
Rule 144A Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 9415, Exchange Act Release No. 69,959, 106 
SEC Docket 3343 (July 10, 2013). 
89. See sources cited supra notes 79, 81. 
90. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995). 
91. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994). 
92. Id. at 192 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“In hundreds of judicial and administrative proceedings 
in every Circuit in the federal system, the courts and the SEC have concluded that aiders and 
abettors are subject to liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.”). 
93. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012). 
94. See Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 173–75 (determining the issue principally based on 
554 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol.  50 
Section 10(b) primary liability, the Supreme Court’s subsequent 
decisions have further confined the scope of private liability.95 With the 
passage of the PSLRA, Congress, inter alia, enhanced a subject plaintiff’s 
pleading requirements,96 provided an expansive safe harbor for publicly 
held companies with respect to their forward-looking statements,97 and 
authorized the levying of significant sanctions.98 
With the “double-whammy” of the PSLRA and confining US Supreme 
Court decisions, plaintiffs in class actions involving publicly held 
enterprises increasingly resorted to the state courts.99 Displeased with this 
development, Congress responded by enacting the Securities Litigation 
Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA).100 With certain exceptions,101 
SLUSA requires that class actions under the Securities Exchange Act102 
involving nationally traded securities must be brought in federal court 
with only federal law applying.103 State securities as well as common law 
 
the language of § 10(b)). For an analysis of Central Bank of Denver, see Marc I. Steinberg, The 
Ramifications of Recent U.S. Supreme Court Decisions on Federal and State Securities Regulation, 
70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 489 (1995). 
95. See Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 564 U.S. 135 (2011) (holding that 
under Rule 10b-5(b), primary liability based on material misrepresentation or half-truth may be 
imposed only upon those persons who have ultimate authority over the statement’s content and 
how it is communicated); Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 522 U.S. 148 
(2008) (rejecting flexible “scheme” liability framework in private actions under § 10(b)).  But see 
Lorenzo v. SEC, 139 S. Ct. 1094 (2019) (holding that persons who knowingly disseminate 
materially false statements subject to liability under Rule 10b-5(a) and (c)). 
96. See § 21D(b) of the Securities Exchange Act; Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 
551 U.S. 308 (2007) (interpreting fraud pleading requirements of the PSLRA); Symposium, 
Strategies for Investigating and Pleading Securities Fraud Claims, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 525 
(2014). 
97. See § 27A of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2 (2012); § 21E of the Securities Exchange 
Act; Slayton v. Am. Express Co., 604 F.3d 758 (2d Cir. 2010) (interpreting parameters of the 
PSLRA safe harbor for forward-looking statements). 
98. See § 27(c) of the Securities Act; § 21D of the Securities Exchange Act; City of Livonia 
Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Boeing Co., 306 F.R.D. 175 (N.D. Ill. 2014); discussion in MARC I. STEINBERG, 
WENDY GERWICK COUTURE, MICHAEL J. KAUFMAN & DANIEL J. MORRISSEY, SECURITIES 
LITIGATION—LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 582–83 (2016). 
99. See H.R. REP. NO. 105-803, at 14 (1998); STEINBERG, COUTURE, KAUFMAN & MORRISSEY, 
supra note 98, at 494 (“After the PSLRA’s enactment, in order to avoid the rigors of federal law, 
plaintiffs sought to bring class actions in state courts.”). 
100. Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (1998). 
101. The key exceptions are individual actions, derivative suits, and class actions in the merger 
and acquisition context (such as going-private transactions, mergers, tender offers, and invocation 
of appraisal rights). See § 16(f)(2) of the Securities Act; § 28(f)(3) of the Securities Exchange Act. 
102. See Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver Cty. Emps. Ret. Fund, 138 S. Ct. 1061 (2018) (holding that class 
actions alleging solely violations of the Securities Act may be brought in state court and are not 
subject to removal pursuant to SLUSA). 
103. See § 16 of the Securities Act; § 28(f) of the Securities Exchange Act. Nationally traded 
securities are those that trade on a national securities exchange. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner 
& Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71 (2006). 
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claims cannot be brought due to SLUSA preemption.104 The consequence 
is that aggrieved investors cannot invoke such attractive claims as those 
based on negligence and aider liability.105 
This preemption has been particularly problematic with respect to 
collateral actors. Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Central Bank 
of Denver, attorneys, investment bankers, and consultants were brought 
within the private-liability umbrella by means of aider and abettor 
claims.106 With the elimination of aider and abettor liability along with 
confining decisions construing the scope of primary liability,107 the 
consequence is that collateral actors all too frequently avoid private 
liability under the federal securities laws.108 This dilemma is exacerbated 
by the enactment of SLUSA which precludes the bringing of meritorious 
state claims premised on negligence and aider liability.109 The 
consequence is that for ordinary investors, who cannot afford to opt out 
of subject class actions, recompense from these allegedly miscreant 
collateral actors will not be forthcoming. SLUSA preemption thereby has 
been antithetical to the investor protection objectives of the federal 
securities laws.110 
III.  THE NEED FOR ENHANCED FEDERALIZATION 
 As set forth in my recent book, three areas merit enhanced 
federalization: the undue deference by federal courts to state law,111 the 
need for congressional enactment of a comprehensive statutory 
framework prohibiting unlawful insider trading,112 and the application of 
 
104. See Dabit, 547 U.S. at 87. 
105. Id. See also Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice, 571 U.S. 377 (2014) (holding that to have 
SLUSA preemption, purchase or sale must be of a “covered” security). 
106. See, e.g., SEC v. Wash. Cty. Util. Dist., 676 F.2d 218 (6th Cir. 1982); IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 
F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1980); Stern v. Am. Bankshares Corp., 429 F. Supp. 818 (E.D. Wis. 1977). 
107. See cases cited supra notes 91, 95. 
108. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc., 482 F.3d 372 
(5th Cir. 2007); Ziemba v. Cascade Int’l, Inc., 256 F.3d 1194 (11th Cir. 2001); Anixter v. 
Home-Stake Prod. Co., 77 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 1996); cases cited supra note 95. 
109. See discussion supra notes 100–05 and accompanying text. 
110. See Lisa L. Casey, Shutting the Doors to State Court: The Securities Litigation Uniform 
Standards Act of 1998, 27 SEC. REG. L.J. 141 (1999); Richard W. Painter, Responding to a False 
Alarm: Federal Preemption of State Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1 
(1998). 
111. See STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 265 (stating that “the Supreme Court’s reliance on state 
law standards to interpret federal law, given the federalization of corporate governance that has 
occurred, is misplaced”). 
112. Id. at 274 (asserting that Congress should “follow the path traversed by other developed 
securities markets and enact an insider trading law premised on either the parity of information or 
equal access to information approach”). 
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federal law to substantive tender offer tactics.113 This Section focuses on 
this last subject—the federalization of substantive tender offer 
maneuvers. 
The legality of offensive and defensive maneuvers undertaken by 
bidder and target companies today, for the most part, is assessed pursuant 
to state law fiduciary standards.114 Federal law generally focuses on the 
process that applies to tender offers115 and, on occasion, forbids the 
undertaking of a particular defensive tactic.116 Nonetheless, the 
application of the internal affairs doctrine117 signifies that Delaware, 
being the state where most major publicly held enterprises elect to 
incorporate,118 is the primary determiner in evaluating the legality of 
substantive maneuvers in the tender offer setting.119 The consequence is 
that Delaware, a state having wonderful beaches and a population of less 
than one million residents,120 serves as adjudicator in determining 
whether billion-dollar global tender offers will be consummated.121 
In a 1985 decision rejecting federal fiduciary standards, the US 
Supreme Court held that Section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act,122 
the Exchange Act’s antifraud provision in the tender offer context, is 
concerned with adequacy of disclosure rather than substantive 
fairness.123 The Court’s ruling thus signified that the propriety of 
takeover maneuvers largely is within state law purview. For the state of 
 
113. Id. at 265–69. 
114. See, e.g., Versata Enters., Inc. v. Selectica, Inc., 5 A.3d 586 (Del. 2010); Omnicare, Inc. v. 
NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003); Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 
A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
115. See, e.g., SEC Rules 14d-6, 14d-8, 14d-9, 14d-10, 14d-11, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14d-6, .14d-8, 
.14d-9, .14d-10, .14d-11 (2018); discussion in STEINBERG, supra note 44, at 443–44. 
116. See, e.g., SEC Rules 13e-4, 14d-10, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13e-4, .14d-10 (requiring tender 
offers to be open to all shareholders and that the best price paid to any such tendering shareholder 
must be paid to any other tendering shareholder); discussion supra notes 47–50 and accompanying 
text. 
117. The internal affairs doctrine generally signifies that the law where the subject company is 
incorporated governs the relations among such company, its directors and officers, and its 
stockholders. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 91 (1987). 
118. See Cary, supra note 22, at 671; Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts 
in the Competition for Corporate Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061 (2000); Mark J. Roe, 
Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588 (2003). 
119. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 114; STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 266. 
120. See Karl Baker, Delaware Population to Approach 1 Million in 2020, DEL. ONLINE (July 
5, 2016, 4:08 PM), http://www.delawareonline.com/story/news/2016/07/05/delaware-population-
approach-1-million-2020/86708466/. 
121. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 114. 
122. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (2012). 
123. Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 8 (1985) (“All three species of misconduct 
[listed in Section 14(e)], i.e., ‘fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative’ . . . are directed at failures to 
disclose.”). 
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Delaware (or any state) to determine matters of national policy under the 
guise of the internal affairs doctrine is an abdication of the federal 
government’s appropriate sphere of authority. To correct this situation, 
substantive maneuvers that are undertaken in mergers and acquisitions 
(including tender offers) that involve enterprises traded on a national 
stock exchange should come within the province of federal law. Congress 
should enact legislation to ensure that the federal government, not states 
whose economic welfare depends in part on revenues generated from fees 
received from enterprises incorporated within their borders, determines 
the legitimacy of substantive maneuvers in M&A deals having national 
and global magnitude.124 
IV.  REACTING TO THE FINANCIAL CRISIS—THE SEC’S NEGLECT TO 
INVOKE CONTROL PERSON LIABILITY 
 In the aftermath of the financial scandals that precipitated the passage 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and the financial crisis that prompted 
Congress to enact the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, the Commission 
instituted numerous enforcement actions, imposing hundreds of millions, 
and even billions, of dollars of money penalties against subject 
enterprises.125 Many of these companies are publicly traded, signifying 
that innocent shareholders incurred the brunt of these fines.126 Yet, only 
on rare occasions did the Commission sue an individual officer or director 
of these enterprises.127 
What is remarkable is that an express statutory provision exists which 
the SEC easily could have utilized and deliberately declined to do 
 
124. See STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 265–69. For one of the earlier articles that advocated for 
federal regulation of substantive maneuvers in tender offers, see Gary G. Lynch & Marc I. 
Steinberg, The Legitimacy of Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 901 (1979). 
See also Marc I. Steinberg, Tender Offer Regulation: The Need for Reform, 23 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 1 (1988). 
125. See, e.g., Citigroup Alt. Invs. LLC & Citigroup Global Markets LLC, Securities Act 
Release No. 9893, Exchange Act Release No. 75,710, 2015 SEC LEXIS 3364 (Aug. 17, 2015); 
Deutsche Bank AG, Exchange Act Release No. 75,040, 2015 SEC LEXIS 2145 (May 26, 2015); 
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., Securities Act Release No. 9992, Exchange Act Release No. 76,694, 
2015 SEC LEXIS 5157 (Dec. 18, 2015); Bank of Am. Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 72,888, 
2014 WL 4101590 (Aug. 21, 2014). 
126. See Marc I. Steinberg & Forrest C. Roberts, Laxity at the Gates: The SEC’s Neglect to 
Enforce Control Person Liability, 11 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 201 (2017) (stating that “allegedly 
blameworthy publicly-traded companies have paid huge monetary penalties—a punishment which 
directly harms their innocent shareholders” (footnote omitted)). 
127. See, e.g., SEC v. Mozilo, No. CV 09-3994-JFW (MANx), 2010 WL 3656068 (C.D. Cal. 
Sept. 16, 2010) (former chief executive officer of Countrywide Financial Corporation); SEC v. 
Delphi Corp., 508 F. App’x 527 (6th Cir. 2012) (former chief accounting officer of Delphi 
Corporation); SEC v. DHB Indus., Inc., Nos. 0:11-CV-60431-JIC, -60432-WPD, 2011 WL 700536 
(S.D. Fla. Feb. 28, 2011) (claims brought against outside directors of company). 
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so—namely, the control person provision. Pursuant to Section 20(a) of 
the Exchange Act, a control person is equally as liable as the person who 
committed the violation unless he or she shows good faith and 
noninducement.128 Hence, a chief executive officer, chief financial 
officer, chief operating officer, chair of the board of directors, lead 
independent director, chair of the audit committee, and/or chair of the 
compensation committee, depending on the facts and circumstances, may 
be deemed control persons of the subject enterprise.129 Accordingly, a 
corporation’s violations of the federal securities laws would subject these 
individuals to joint and several liability, with the affirmative defense of 
good faith and noninducement being available.130 
The control person provision may be viewed as federalizing a 
component of a fiduciary’s duty of care and loyalty—namely, the duty of 
disclosure.131 When a publicly held corporation engages in deficient 
disclosure, those fiduciaries who are deemed control persons are equally 
liable unless they establish their affirmative defense under Section 20(a). 
The control person statute thus functions as a law compliance 
mechanism132—seeking to effectuate lawful conduct while sanctioning 
noncompliant fiduciaries who fail to adhere to their disclosure oversight 
responsibilities.133 
With regularity, plaintiffs in class actions plead Section 20(a) control 
person claims against corporate fiduciaries.134 The provision clearly is 
available to the SEC;135 yet, the Commission neglected to invoke this 
 
128. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (2012). 
129. See, e.g., Maverick Fund, L.D.C. v. Comverse Tech., Inc., 801 F. Supp. 2d 41 (E.D.N.Y. 
2011); In re Tronox, Inc. Sec. Litig., 769 F. Supp. 2d 202 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Salit v. Stanley Works, 
802 F. Supp. 728 (D. Conn. 1992). 
130. Accordingly, once a primary violation of a controlled person adequately is alleged, 
asserting a Section 20(a) claim is subject to a generally low pleading threshold. See Steinberg & 
Roberts, supra note 126, at 215. 
131. See, e.g., Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 14 (Del. 1998) (stating that Delaware law 
“protects shareholders who receive false communications from directors even in the absence of a 
request for shareholder action”). 
132. Depending on the applicable facts and circumstances, gatekeepers may be control persons. 
See, e.g., Rospatch Sec. Litig., [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 96,939 (W.D. 
Mich. July 8, 1992) (attorney and law firm). Gatekeepers generally encompass attorneys and 
accountants who, in a securities law setting, are well situated to detect improper conduct and who 
have the ability to withhold their essential services in order to prevent such misconduct from 
eventuating or continuing. See Lawson v. FMR LLC, 571 U.S. 429, 448–51 (2014); Fred Zacharias, 
Lawyers as Gatekeepers, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1387, 1389 (2004) (“Lawyers are gatekeepers and 
always have been.”). 
133. See Steinberg & Roberts, supra note 126, at 207–16. 
134. Id. at 238 (citing cases and stating that “within the last three years, cases have been filed 
in every single U.S. circuit alleging Section 20(a) control person liability”). 
135. Pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, Congress reaffirmed that the Commission has 
the authority to invoke Section 20(a) in its enforcement actions. See § 929P(c) of the Dodd-Frank 
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provision in these times of crisis. The Commission has no explanation for 
this failure. One can only speculate. Even with a democratic 
administration in power and a former US Attorney (Mary Jo White) as its 
chair, one may ask: was the SEC overly concerned with the “noise” that 
would have ensued from corporate America if it had invoked this 
provision against “upstanding” members of the business community? 
Unfortunately, no member of Congress has called upon the SEC to 
explain its reluctance—including Senators Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth 
Warren.136 
Very recently, perhaps due to an article that I coauthored on this 
subject137 (at least I can pretend that to be the reason), the SEC resolved 
an enforcement action against corporate officers in a publicly held 
company premised on control person liability. In SEC v. ITT Educational 
Services, Inc.,138 the former chief executive officer and former chief 
financial officer of the company entered into a settlement based on their 
noncompliance with the control person provision of Section 20(a).139 
Whether this proceeding is an aberration or represents the 
commencement of the Commission invoking Section 20(a) with vigor is 
yet to be determined. What is clear, however, is that the SEC abysmally 
failed in its law enforcement obligations by neglecting to utilize the 
control person provision to pursue corporate fiduciaries after the financial 
scandals two decades ago and the financial crisis a decade ago.140 
 
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1865 (2010) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (2012)). Prior 
to that legislation, the majority of courts that addressed the issue held that the SEC had the authority 
to utilize Section 20(a). See, e.g., SEC v. Hawk, No. 03:05-CV-00172-LRH-VPC, 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 57414, at *6 (D. Nev. Aug. 3, 2007) (stating that “the majority of courts have concluded 
that an SEC enforcement action can be brought pursuant to Section 20(a)”). 
136. Although these senators at times have been critical of the Commission, apparently they 
have not focused on the SEC’s failure to invoke the control person provision. See infra note 139. 
137. See Steinberg & Roberts, supra note 126. 
138. SEC v. IIT Educ. Servs., Inc., SEC Litigation Release No. 24,188, 2018 WL 3344233 (S.D. 
Ind. July 9, 2018). 
139. Id. at *1. Pursuant to settlement, the defendants were enjoined, received a five-year bar 
from serving as an officer or director of a publicly held company, the former CEO paid a $200,000 
money penalty, and the former CFO paid a $100,000 money penalty. Id. In a letter to SEC Chairman 
Clayton, Senators Blumenthal, Brown, Durban, and Warren criticized the Commission for the 
“measly fine amounts” that are “nothing more than a parking ticket . . . .” Letter from Senators 
Blumenthal, Brown, Durban, & Warren to SEC Chairman Clayton (July 20, 2018), available at 
https://www.durbin.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/7.20.18%20ITT%20SEC%20 
letter%20FINAL.pdf. While the senators’ criticism has merit, what they perhaps did not realize 
was that this proceeding may have represented the first instance in a prolonged period that the SEC 
invoked the control person provision against corporate fiduciaries of a publicly traded company. 
140. See STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 283 (“For whatever reason, which the Commission has 
declined to articulate, it has not utilized [the control person] provision.”); Steinberg & Roberts, 
supra note 126, at 206 (asserting that “it is inexplicable why the SEC declines to focus on this 
manifestly clear statutory [Section 20(a)] remedy to address the blatant misconduct that transpires 
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CONCLUSION 
The federalization of corporate governance is an evolutionary process 
that began at the beginning of the twentieth century. Through the decades, 
this process has gone through periods of gradual transition, activism, and 
stagnation. Certainly, the Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank Acts have 
intensified this process. Today, to the greatest extent in our nation’s 
history, federal law plays a central role in the governance of publicly held 
corporations. Undoubtedly, this federalization process will serve as a 
primary determiner for the continuing stability of the US securities 
markets and the quest for meaningful investor protection. 
 
 
[and that this article] will seek to determine why the SEC has neglected to bring enforcement 
actions based on control person liability against executives of Wall Street’s biggest miscreants”). 
